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Abstract—As cloud computing has become the most popular 
computing platform, and cloud-based applications a 
commonplace, the methods and mechanisms used to ensure their 
survivability is increasingly becoming paramount. One of the 
prevalent trends in recent times is a turn to nature for inspiration 
in developing and supporting highly survivable environments. 
This paper aims to address the problems of survivability in cloud 
environments through inspiration from nature. In particular, the 
community metaphor in nature’s predator-prey systems where 
autonomous individuals’ local decisions focus on ensuring the 
global survival of the community. Thus, we develop analogies for 
survivability in cloud computing based on a range of mechanisms 
which we view as key determinants of prey’s survival against 
predation. For this purpose we investigate some predator-prey 
systems that will form the basis for our analogical designs. 
Furthermore, due to a lack of a standardized definition of 
survivability, we propose a unified definition for survivability, 
which emphasizes as imperative, a high level of proactiveness to 
thwart black swan events, as well as high capacity to respond to 
insecurity in a timely and appropriate manner, inspired by 
prey’s avoidance and anti-predation approaches.  
Keywords—Survivability; Predator-prey; Cloud-computing; 
Analogie 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In the military context, survivability contemplates damage 
tolerance and avoidance, i.e. vulnerability, recoverability, and 
susceptibility, as central and congruent to survivability 
assessment and decision-making. In nature, several biological 
theories describe survivability through evolutionary principles 
and concepts such as adaptation. In the computing domain, 
survivability research is said to have advanced due to the 
development of critical infrastructures such as 
telecommunications networks, power grids, etc. In this 
context, the notion of survivability is deeply aligned with the 
ability to ensure the timely delivery of services when faced 
with planned or unplanned faults or failures, and deliberate or 
accidental attacks. Four survivability themes can thus be 
identified; resistance (ability to repel an attack), intrusion 
detection (ability to recognize an intrusion), recovery 
(capacity to resume complete and/or essential services after 
fault, failure or attack), and adaptation (capacity to evolve to 
cope with similar attacks, faults or failures).  
In cloud computing environments, survivability revolves 
around the wide adoption of virtualisation technologies, broad 
network access and on-demand nature of services and 
resources. More critical to survivability in the cloud-
computing context, is the complexity of the security 
landscape, which is an underlying issue central to this paper. 
Traditional computing environments’ concerns revolved 
around security, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of information. In contrast, cloud computing’s concerns are 
multi-faceted. In addition to its service aspect, its outsourcing 
element, its un-perimeterised nature, and accessibility over the 
internet, security in cloud computing should be viewed in 
unison with survivability. In fact, one would argue that cloud 
computing research requires greater focus and attention 
towards standardizing survivability, including its definition 
and developing a standard survivability concept. Nonetheless, 
survivability is viewed as a product of an appropriate 
combinations of variables (closest combination with correct 
magnitudes, parameters, etc.), such that its magnitude depends 
on the role of individual variables and the stages in life history 
of each entity [1]. According to the authors, the following are 
factors upon which survivability can be evaluated: resistance 
to deleterious agents, competitive saprophytic ability, 
responsiveness, and multinational capability. Here, resistance 
to deleterious agents encompasses environmental dynamics 
such as temperature and radiation upon which survival may be 
attributed. Similarly, competitive saprophytic ability 
highlights active actions or processes in which fungi that 
rapidly grows and germinate to develop good enzymes which 
develop impeccable capacity to produce antibiotics, but 
tolerance the same antibiotics from other sources, acting as a 
sure way for survival [1]. Furthermore, mutational capacity 
which is responsible for protein synthesis is viewed as a 
predicate for adaptation and survivability of body cells. Thus, 
the authors postulate survivability according to how 
responsive organisms are to stimuli within their environment. 
It is reasonable based on the foregoing, to imagine 
survivability as the reliance upon the timely recognition of 
changes in the environment, to implement necessary 
responses. 
Due to the lack of standardized definition of survivability, 
[2] recommends the following as basic components for 
survivability: a definition which distinguishes the 
environments for which it is defined, an identified and 
clarified type of threat to survivability should be identified, for 
instance, attacks that are intentional or accidental, or faults and 
errors, the ability to adapt in the event of a threat to ensure a 
continued provision of services, acceptable level of service 
continuity, and timeous service provision. 
This paper aims to address survivability in cloud 
computing environments, i.e. the ability to continue providing 
services under deliberate attack, using an analogous system in 
nature. An analogical approach is suitable not only because it 
is a systematic method to transfer concepts across domains, 
but aids in developing a comprehensive definition of 
survivability for cloud computing environments, principally 
inspired by nature’s well-tested systems. In addition, the 
analogical approach offers the following benefits: 
 Represents common behaviors, mechanisms and 
methods.  
 Developed as modular components enabling system 
modelling to scale with new additional features.  
 Simplicity of analogies enables the deconstruction of 
otherwise complex behaviours.  
 Enables the extraction of secondary survival 
mechanisms, for instance, where prey parents resort 
to mobbing, counter-attack or sacrificing off-springs 
to increase survival chances for the majority. This 
analogy can therefore be reused regardless of its 
initial outcome.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Apart from semantics around the definition of 
survivability, there seems to be a consensus on the core areas 
closely related to survivability. Such areas include resilience, 
dependability, fault-tolerance, assurance, fault-tolerance, 
availability, performability, etc. Since survivability in this 
research focuses upon the security context of cloud 
infrastructures, survivability reviews considered in this section 
will focus upon the functionality of components of computing 
infrastructures individually, as well as a networked system in 
its entirety. [3] coined the term survivability-over-security 
(SOS) to describe the survivability goals of simultaneously 
reducing sum vulnerabilities which increasing recovery and 
flexibility in networked systems. These authors however 
digress from the view postulated in this research, that the 
survivability of individual system components is indeed vital 
to the overall survivability of an entire networked system. A 
case in point in cloud environments is cloud computing 
storage security, which encompasses storage components such 
storage isolation, data recovery, storage place as determinants 
of long-term data survivability [4]. Table 1 below is a 
summary of some prominent definitions from [2]’s survey of 
survivability?  
In the predator-prey dynamic, predation is said to increase 
the probability of prey extinction, itself an indicator of the 
survivability of that specie [5]. Prey populations survivability 
is impacted by an interaction of demographic, environmental 
and genetic factors [6]. Discovering the critical survival 
mechanisms for cloud environments considers both, the 
subjective and objective selection of anti-predator and 
predation avoidance mechanisms (techniques and behaviours) 
employed prey species. Mechanisms may exist as specific 
(where mechanisms are effective against a specific predator), 
or non-specific (where strategies are effective against all 
predators) [7] 
 
 
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE DEFINITIONS FOR SURVIVABILITY 
NO DEFINITION 
1 To provide quantitative measures for the network's capability to tolerate failures and to provide continuous service. 
2 Defined in terms of network survivability where it is (1) the ability of a network to maintain or restore an acceptable level of performance during network 
failure conditions by applying various restoration techniques and (2) the mitigation or prevention of service outages from potential network failures by 
applying preventative techniques. 
3 The quality of a system to handle all essentially critical operation instances successfully.  
4 The capability of a system to fulfil its mission in a timely manner in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. 
5 The ability of a system to continue operation despite the presence of abnormal events such as failures and intrusions. 
6 A network's ability to perform its designated set of functions given network infrastructure component failures, resulting in a service outage, which can be 
described by the number of services affected, the number of subscribers affected, and the duration of the outage. 
7 Robustness under conditions of intrusion, failure, or accident. 
8 The ability of a system to maintain a set of essential services despite the presence of abnormal events such as faults and intrusions. 
9 That a system can be made robust to partially successful attack through general architecture features, through adaptability (flexible response to 
unanticipated changes) and flexibility (ability to adapt to a range of adverse events without having to anticipate the response in advance). 
10 To provide network design and management procedures towards minimizing the impact of failures on multi-networks. 
11 The ability of a system to tolerate intentional attacks or accidental failures or errors. 
12 Defined in terms of information survivability where it is the ability of an information system to continue to operate in the presence of faults, anomalous 
system behaviour, or malicious attack. 
13 The ability of a system to provide service (possibly degraded) when various changes occur in the system or operating environment. 
14  Where network systems continue functioning even when under attack. 
15 The ability of a system/network to be maintained in the working state, given that a deterministic set of failures occurs to the system/network; therefore, the 
survivability is always “yes” or “no” for a given failure scenario. 
16 Phases of survivability are attack detection, damage confinement, damage assessment and repair, and attack avoidance focusing on continued service and 
recovery. 
17 The capacity of a system to provide essential services even after successful intrusion and compromise, and to recover full services in a timely manner. 
18 Network design and management procedures to minimize the impact of failures on the network.  
19 Defined in the terms of a telecommunications network where it is the ability of the network to maintain or restore an acceptable level of performance in the 
event of deterministic or random network failures, such as link failures and node failures.  
20 Defined in terms of performance where it will ensure that, under given failure scenarios, network performance will not degrade below predetermined 
levels.  
21 The ability of a network to cope with facility outages, capacity overloads, and natural disasters. 
22 The measure of the degree of keeping the performances of a kind of military weaponry or equipment’s or other military forces, which undergoing enemy's 
attacks.  
23 The measure of a network's endurance in the presence of possible component failures (of the measure of the magnitude of attack needed to render a 
network non-functional). 
24 The ability of an item to perform a required function at a given instant in time after a specified subset of components of the item to become unavailable. 
25 Where survivable network must achieve an acceptable level of performance under demanding conditions. 
26 The assurance of stored information's integrity, confidentiality, and continuous availability guaranteed over time. 
27 Defined in terms of survivable information systems through adaptation where it is allowing a system to continue running, albeit with reduced functionality 
or performance in the face of reduced resources, attacks, or broken components is often preferable to either complete shutdown or continued normal 
operation in compromised mode. 
28 Defined in terms of a survivable system where it must be adaptable, able to respond to attacks and achieve its goals. 
29 The capability of a system to complete its mission in a timely manner, even if significant portions are incapacitated by attack or accident. 
30 The degree to which a system can withstand an attack or attacks, and is still able to function at a certain level in its new state after the attack. 
31 Defined in terms of a survivable system where it satisfies its survivability specification of essential services and adverse environments. 
32 The extent to which the software will perform and support critical functions without failures within a specified period when a portion of the system is 
inoperable. 
 
III. PREY POLULATION SURVIVAL AS ANALOGY FOR 
SURVIVABILITY IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
There is abundant evidence of the use of nature analogies 
to study and inspire inventions in other domains, including 
computing. As suggested by the authors in [8], the use of 
nature systems for creative and novel solutions to human 
problems is now common place. For instance, a predator-prey 
analogy postulating computing infrastructures as 
homogenously susceptible to attacks, or susceptibility to 
attack as being heterogeneous [9]. In this instance, security 
approaches (homogeneous or heterogeneous) are assumed to 
focus upon traditional computing’s physical infrastructures 
that exist within a static boundary security fence [10]. 
Analogies aim to capture unique diversification mechanisms 
in both homogeneous and heterogeneous environments. While 
the analogy for cloud computing as a metaphor for the internet 
synonymous to electricity as a utility [11] has been hugely 
successful, the increased use of analogies in computing 
demands coherent and systematic approaches for deciding and 
translating apt functions, behaviours, mechanisms, etc. from 
one environment to the next. Despite the glaring opportunities 
analogies present, failure to systematically decide and 
translate concepts across domains punctuates what the authors 
in [8] describe as a fundamental sources of problems within 
this cross-domain approach, due to the disconnect between 
nature systems and other domains. 
In the remainder of this section, we aim to present the 
survivability of cloud computing infrastructures, systems or 
services against deliberate attacks analogous to survival of 
prey species under constant predation. Our approach maps leaf 
and high-level attributes of both domains (nature and cloud), 
focusing upon processes and sub-processes at each level.  
A. Survival in Nature 
Animals in nature share habitats where an abundance of 
food is vital for their survival. To avoid dying, predators 
evolve to increase their chances of catching and eating prey, 
e.g. speed or strength. Similarly, prey will not survive if 
without evolving and adapting well enough to avoid or evade 
capture, e.g. speed, smell, camouflage, poison, etc. Thus, 
predation avoidance and anti-predation mechanisms are the 
main attributes of prey diversification that define how prey 
species behave in order to improve its selection, and 
survivability [12]. Group size from an evolution perspective, 
is a leaf attributes which affects the stability of predator-prey 
ecosystems where one species influences another, and 
different co-evolutionary parameters have an overall effect on 
survivability of the ecosystem [13]. In this case, the size of a 
group directly affects investment in anti-predator behaviours, 
predation pressures such as death rate, and consequently 
reproductive cycles of species, which are themselves 
determents of species extinction and survival. As suggested by 
[14], animals who live in groups are organised to synchronize 
their activities and move collectively. Figure 1 below 
illustrates high-level and leaf attributes in nature, whereupon 
relationships and interactions among animals where one 
depends on the other for food and survival are complex [15]. 
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Fig.  1. High-level and leaf attributes for survival in nature 
 
The need to find food necessitates that prey communities 
are organised to facilitate safety while foraging, primarily 
against confirmed and potential predators [16]. Similarly, 
whether prey has an unlimited food source, whether prey 
suffers very little predation, or whether a prey species is 
predated by multiple predator species (gazelle hunted by lion, 
cheetah, wild dogs, hyena) impacts foraging biases and 
choices, which in turn impact upon death rates and the 
evolution of reproduction patterns. Indeed, anti-predator 
behaviours as a function of prey organisation is therefore 
attributed to factors such as the abundance of food, predatory 
behaviours of predators, and the density of predators, among 
others. In studying mice’s anti-predatory behaviors, [17] 
allude to the notion that prey is indeed aware of the density of 
predators in their environments and organise themselves 
accordingly to increase foraging success while avoiding 
predation.  
At a local level, reproduction, predator death rate, migration 
trends, hunting trends, patterns and intensity of competition, 
etc. affect the state of a predator-prey ecosystem. The factors 
exist interactively, whereupon values of one factor depend on 
the others. As such, the evaluation of the importance of each 
attribute is determined by the community’s overall survival as 
evidence by population changes and species composition. A 
common evaluation method is broadly quantified through 
Lotka and Vito Volterra’s equations [18] below:  where K is 
the maximum number of individuals’ a given habitat can 
accommodate and the populations of predators (P) and prey 
(N) is determined by constant a, b, c, and e, such that:  
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A similar approach is used in an experimental simulation to 
predict the imminent extinction of species in nature. As has 
been demonstrated and explained in Lotka and Volterra’s 
equations, predator and prey interactions determine the 
survival or extinction of species. Predation increase the 
probability of prey extinction and threaten the overall 
survivability of that specie [5]. In the underlying argument, 
survivability is thus impacted by an interface of demographic, 
environmental, and genetic factors and conditions. The ability 
to avoid and/or counter any threat survival, means that prey 
communities avoid extinction and improve their overall 
fitness. Prey offsprings are particularly vulnerable to known 
predators as they cannot defend themselves, and therefore are 
highly dependent on their parents.  
Population extinction and persistence have applications in 
ecological studies to describe how species manage to survive 
over others. In the predator-prey dynamic, predation is 
considered an environmental stressor on prey survivability 
[19]. Evidence in ecological studies opinion individualist 
attributes such as physiological tolerance and fitness in 
individuals, as expressive of the importance of habitats and 
competition, and uniquely impact the construction of species 
communities. Based on the foregoing, we suggest the 
following as the most important aspects upon which we base 
our survivability analogy for cloud computing environments:  
 The ability to detect triggers such as threats, and 
institute appropriate countermeasures in a timely 
manner is reliant upon strategies, technological 
inventions such as hardware and software, and other 
techniques.  
 Self-management, cooperation, adaptation and the 
ability to escalate defensive countermeasures enhance 
survivability. 
 Diversity, integration, and the ability for self-
management of cloud systems and services enhance 
survivability.  
B. Survivability in Cloud Computing 
This section presents our interpretation of the survivability 
analogy based on prey survival against predation discussed in 
the section above. The following scenario outlines the pillars 
for the survivability concept under consideration summarized 
in Table 2 below.  
 Changes in service availability and attacks are 
oscillatory. An increase in attacks is followed by a 
decrease in service availability, while a decrease in 
service availability is followed by a decrease in 
attacks. 
 Where there are very few adversaries, services 
survivability increases, while very many adversaries 
cause a decrease in services survivability. However, 
where there are very many services, adversary 
survivability increases, however, if there are very few 
services, adversary survivability decreases. 
 Where cooperation is high, the number of thwarted 
attacks increases and survivability increases, and 
similarly proactiveness increase services availability. 
 
TABLE 2. PILLARS FOR SURVIVABILITY ANALOGY 
Aspect Analogy from 
nature 
Translation in cloud 
Threats  Prey in groups 
detects predators, 
improving survival 
chances  
Ability to detect threats enhances 
a timeous response, with best 
strategy or countermeasure 
Collective 
action 
Prey’s collective 
foraging biases, 
predation avoidance 
methods, and 
reproduction are a 
result of evolution 
and adaptation.  
The ability to self-manage, 
cooperate, adapt and escalate 
integrated countermeasure 
techniques means that the 
number of thwarted attacks 
increases and survivability 
increases. 
Management Prey animals’ co-
habitat to share 
food, reproduce to 
improve their fitness 
and avoid extinction  
Diversity, autonomy, integration, 
and the ability for self-
management of cloud systems 
and services enhance 
survivability 
 
Fig. 2. below is an illustration of the survivability analogy 
for cloud computing environments based upon prey survival 
attributes presented in Fig. 1. Since the business vision of 
cloud service providers includes assurances for quality, 
reliability, the availability of services [20], leaf attributes such 
as recovery time (RT) and recovery objective (RO) as well as 
sustainable pricing to maximize profits are pertinent to cloud 
service providers. In this scenario, responsibility for security 
and availability of services including security affecting the 
customer’s infrastructure lies with the CSP [21]. In a 
traditional sense, security concerns primarily revolved around 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.  
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Fig.  2.  A visual illustration of prey survivability analogy for cloud computing environments.   (a) illustrates the leaf attributes upon which high-level attributes of 
survival depend. (b) is our translation of this analogy showing leaf attributes upon which the high-level attributes of service survivability depend.    
 
Evidence in literature suggests that predator-prey inspired 
solutions are successful as perimeter security [22] and worm 
detection and patching [23]. The analogy being that models 
with Holling-Ill functional response are useful for describing 
scenarios where the processing and foraging for food are 
mutually exclusive and generally prey dependent [24]. Thus, 
we hypothesise adversary-defender models analogous to 
predator-prey models as indicative of the defender populations 
(service availability) in the presence of semantic and flooding 
DDoS attacks and FRC attacks which are detrimental to a 
cloud consumer.  
While Equation 1 is commonly used to predict the imminent 
extinction of species in nature and hence their survival, we 
propose analogous methods for predicting the availability of 
cloud services and hence their overall survivability. Foremost, 
cloud services (assuming a cloud service as equivalent to a 
virtual machine instant) have average probability, P, of being 
available, where VMinUp and VMnotUp represents total 
number of VMs in a normally and abnormally operating state 
as described by Equation 2. In addition, the average 
availability of a virtual machine, AV, is defined as the 
probability that there are defensive VMs, VMax, 
(countermeasure agent) available as shown in Equation 3.   
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Since virtual machine vulnerabilities to side-channel 
attacks exposes IaaS to data breaches [25], survivability means 
that a CSP can guarantee in their SLA, an acceptable level of 
service despite intentional attack or compromise. Thus, 
evaluating survivability would consider two main methods: 
the state of IaaS components (virtual machines), as well as the 
behaviour of the environment, i.e. whether the infrastructure is 
operational. Thus, a survivable system should (1) provide 
availability and security (Integrity and Confidentiality) of 
services and infrastructures, and (2) meet as closely possible, 
their expected capacity.  
Cause the Operating System (OS) kernel to crash [26] [27] 
[28] [29]. By logically layering and separating components, 
CA’s lifecycle ensures effective disaster recovery and high 
availability [30]. BioRAC provide a self-managed platform 
with high resilience, enabling the availability of services, 
whether there is a failure, accident or attack [31]. 
C. Survivability Definition 
Survivability in cloud environments is viewed as 
composite notion; the availability of services, resources or 
infrastructure (availability), prevention of unauthorised 
disclosure of data (confidentiality), and prevention of 
unauthorised deletion and/or modification of data (integrity). 
We take a unified approach, which emphasises as imperative, 
a high level of proactiveness to thwart black swan events, as 
well as high capacity to respond to insecurity in a timely and 
appropriate manner. Thus, we define survivability as the 
capacity to timely implement a series of proactive survival 
responses (akin to prey individuals in nature) in recognition to 
changes within an environment to ensure a high magnitudes of 
service availability. We characterise survivability in cloud 
environments according to the following three-tuple events: 
 A series of prey-inspired responses to ensure that 
cloud platforms remain highly available despite 
intentional or incidental attacks by known or unknown 
adversaries. 
 Proactive strategies implemented in priority according 
to the severity of an attack as well as the system’s 
requirements 
 Escalation of response as an objective function for 
optimising survivability, where X = (x1, x2, x3, x4 
…xn) is a series of prey-inspired survival properties to 
ensure that cloud environments remain highly 
available regardless of attacks. Vector Y = (y1, y2, 
y3…yn) is a series of proactive preferences for the 
cloud system, and Z is the objective function for 
optimising survivability in the cloud. 
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Thus, evaluating survivability considers two main methods: 
the state of IaaS components (virtual machines), as well as the 
behaviour of the environment, i.e. whether the infrastructure is 
operational. Thus, a survivable system should;   
 Provide availability and security (Integrity and 
Confidentiality) of services and infrastructures.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
This paper sought to develop a survivability analogy for 
cloud environments based on the survivability metaphor in 
predator-prey systems by focus upon unique mechanisms prey 
species employ to enhance their survivability against 
predation. The proposed solution is based upon the prey 
community model, where autonomous individuals’ local 
decisions focus upon enhancing the global survival of the 
community. Mechanisms of avoiding predation employed by 
prey species are assumed unique to the predator-prey dynamic 
and central to the survivability of prey species. Thus, a range 
of escalating predation avoidance behaviours and anti-
predation techniques employed by prey are assumed as 
determinants of prey survivability.  
Similarly, mechanisms for defending the cloud, employed 
as countermeasures, are assumed as unique to the adversary-
defender dynamic and therefore central to the survivability of 
cloud environments. Building upon gap-filling 
recommendations for addressing current cloud security 
challenges presented in Chapter 2, a range of escalating 
proactive techniques (passive to aggressive) employed as 
countermeasures, are assumed as determinants of survivability 
in cloud environments. Unlike the single solution approach 
characteristic in existing cloud security solutions, the 
community approach enables rapid reaction based on the 
ability to make local but synchronised decisions, whereupon 
escalation enables the proposed system to invoke appropriate 
proactive security responses based on the nature of threat; 
ranging from passive to aggressive.  
Foremost, it entails a systematic process for developing 
and mapping analogies for the survivability phenomenon, and 
the development of bespoke cloud-ecological tools and 
platforms. Since this solution is inspired by nature, the 
objective is to develop analogies which best describe the 
inventive approach central to the proposed system.  
To enhance the survivability in cloud infrastructures, 
foremost, proactive strategies including deceptive, pre-
emptive, etc. are implemented to maintain the state of the 
environment at best, or ensures the system copes with any 
form of destructive encounter (see sections 4.1 for detailed 
explanation) between adversaries and defenders. Alternatively, 
that the system should remain unaltered by the same.  
Defenders seek out appropriate strategies to meet the 
survivability objective under the assumption that cloud 
infrastructures encounter highly diversified threats, from a 
broad landscape. Furthermore, resources to counteract the 
implications of such interactions, including technological, 
strategic, investment and training, are assumed inadequate. 
Nonetheless, to attain survivability, the system’s robustness is 
paramount. We put forward the claim that the interplay 
between insecurity and the capability to be secure, describes 
the concept of survivability. Along these lines, the 
survivability concept is described as a metric for evaluating 
the performance of the system under intentional attack [32]. In 
other works, it is also defined as a system’s ability to timely 
fulfil its mission during an attack or failure. Due to the 
complexity and multi-disciplinary nature of the proposed 
system, its development is modular and iterative. The first 
stage involved investigating survivability in the inspirational 
predator-prey systems whereupon theoretical designs are 
developed. The second stage will build upon the former stage 
focusing upon survivability in cloud environments involved 
the development of the analogies in cloud environments.  
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